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ABSTRACT 
The question of how an efficient competitive equilibrium could 
be reached through a pricing mechanism in which the information 
acquisition is endogenously determined ie addressed. The traditional 
oligopoly market is extended to include an ex ante information market 
when there is uncertainty either in the cost function or the demand 
function. Equilibrium behavior is characterized in a two-stage 
noncooperative game involving n production firms and m research firms 
in the industry. As the environment becomes more competitive, 
meaning, both the information market and the tangible good market 
become large, the equilibrium random price of the product converges 
almost surely to its competitive price level with certainty and 
consequently the total social welfare (consumer plus producer surplus) 
is maximized. 
AN EFFICIENT MARKET MECHANISM 
WITH ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ACQUISITION: 
COURNOT OLIGOPOLY CASE• 
Lode Li 
California Institute of Technology 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Two lines of research in the literature motivate this study. 
First, Wilson (1977), later extended by Hilgrom (1979), shows that 
under fairly general conditions the winning bid converges to the true 
value of the object at auction as the number of bidders becomes large 
and indicates that the bidding can serve as a basis of competitive 
price formation. As Matthews (1984) points out, however, that 
endogeneity of costly information acquisition can alter the 
convergence property of auction mechanism. Secondly, the question 
whether diverse imperfect information may be processed via other 
market pricing mechanism as perfectly as it is processed in an auction 
is studied by Li (1985) and Palfrey (1985) in a Cournot-Bayesian 
oligopoly setting , and it is shown that the random equilibrium price 
converges almost surely to the perfectly competitive price as the 
number of firms becomes arbitrarily large. But again, the amount of 
• I gratefully acknowledge the insightful suggestion of my former 
teacher Horton Kamien. The paper is a continuation work on the basis 
of "Optimal Research for Cournot Oligopolists, " a joint work with my 
colleagues Richard D. HcKelvey and Talbot Page, I have also benefited 
from my discussion with Leonid Hurwicz and Quang H. Vuong. 
information each firm acquires is not only exogenously determined but 
costless as well. Li, McKelvey and Page (1985) show in great detail, 
the sources of the inefficiency are inadequate amount of information 
acquired as well as incomplete information pooling when the amount of 
information obtained is costly. Therefore the convergence properties 
described above fail if endogeneity of information acquisition is 
introduced by simply associating a positive cost to obtaining the 
relevant information. 
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In this paper the market mechanism studied in the previous 
work is augmented by introducing an extra market for ex ante 
information trading and studies the equilibrium value of the 
information. We show that this augmentation may eliminate the 
weakness suffered from the endogenous information acquisition in the 
previous models and that the convergence theorem prevails as the 
environment (both the information market and the tangible good market) 
becomes more competitive. 
We study an oligopolistic industry in which there is 
uncertainty either in the cost function or the demand function. In 
addition, there is a group of firms who undertake research aiming at 
resolving the uncertainty. By subcontracting research to these firms, 
each production firm can acquire exclusive information which may help 
it resolve the uncertainty and thereby make a more informed decision 
on the level of output. It is noteworthy that the industries which 
specialize in information acquisition and processing have been booming 
for years. For instance, an enormous number of marketing research or 
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consulting firms are in service for a variety of industries. 
Regarding the cost information research, the chemical industry has a 
long tradition of subcontracting the preliminary toxicological tests 
of new products (which are critical in estimating the liabilities that 
may have to be paid if the products are eventually found to be toxic} 
to independent laboratories and research institutes, Therefore. 
developing an equilibrium model to study the behavior of production 
firms versus research firms is not only of theoretic interest but also 
of practical importance. 
Equilibrium behavior is characterized in a noncooperative game 
involving n + m players - the n production firms and m research firms 
in the industry. Prior to observing the information, each research 
firm chooses a research level to sell whereas each production firm 
chooses a level of information to buy in a simultaneous move. Then, 
the research firms undertake research and producers observe the 
exclusive signals from the contracted research results and 
simultaneously choose levels of production based on the data. This is 
a two-stage game. The equilibrium definition we use is that of a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, the ex ante 
information that we refer to as research is traded in a measurement of 
the expected precision of the signal. It is assumed that the research 
contract is sold at a single price per unit of research. The payoff 
to each production firm can be determined as the expected net profit 
assuming the Cournot-Bayesian equilibrium behavior follows in the 
second stage. The payoff to each research firm is the total amount it 
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extracts from selling the research data. The Nash equilibrium of this 
game uniquely determines the value of research as well as the total 
amount of research traded. In the second stage game, the unique 
Cournot-Bayesian equilibrium determines the ex post price of the 
tangible good. This two-stage game parallels the two-stage game 
introduced by Kamien and Tauman (1984a, 1984b) in which a patent 
holder licenses cost reducing invention to the producers in a n- firm 
oligopoly by means of a fee. What this two-stage game amounts to, in 
their analysis, as here, is first finding the demand function for 
research and then maximizing against it. The demand function for 
research is derived from the Bayesian solution of the second stage of 
the game and then using it in the first stage of the game. 
This paper is arranged in five sections, including the present 
one. Section 2 is devoted to stating the assumptions, developing the 
notations, and presenting the specifications of the game. A unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived in Section 3. A 
convergence theorem is proved and the efficiency implication is 
discussed in Section 4. Some concluding remarks follow. 
2 . THE MODEL 
Consider an industry with n identical firms producing a 
homogenous output. The production firms face a stochastic inverse 
demand function given by D-1(0,9) = a +  9 - bQ, where Q = �1qi is the 
total quantity produced, and e is the true state of the world which is 
unknown when the output decisions are made. Producers have identical 
s 
constant unit cost of production, c, such that O < c i a. While we 
assume the uncertainty arises in the intercept of the demand function, 
the analysis is identical if the uncertainty arises from the 
coefficient c in the cost function. There are also m identical 
research firms conducting research to acquire information concerning 
the true state of the world e. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that e is generated 
according to a probability distribution g(e) with zero mean. Denote 
by yij the signal that producer i is to receive from researcher j. 
Assume yij is generated according to the conditional distribution
h(yij l e,tij) where 
(1) 
The measurement tij is used as the level of research that producer i 
contracts from researcher j prior to the observation of the signal 
yij' It is a measure of the expected precision of the state-relevant 
research data in trade. By using this measurement, we may treat the 
ex ante research contracts as ordinary goods. This can be justified 
as follows. First, the higher the quantity tij' the lower the 
expected variance and therefore the better the quality of the 
resulting signal. Second, note that tij is directly proportional to
the number of observations if the data is obtained from independent 
sampling. In the example of the toxicological tests of chemicals, tij 
is directly proportional to, say, the number of animals used in the 
test, other things being equal. Third, we shall see shortly that only 
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tij affect the payoffs to producers prior to observing the signals yij 
and the expected profit of producer i strictly increases as the amount 
n 
of information to receive, ti, increases, where ti
= f' tij ' .1=1 
Therefore, the value of tij plays a similar role as the quantity 
measurement of other inputs in the production process. 
Further assumptions on the information structure are as 
follows: 
Assumption Al (independence) yij' i 
independent conditional on 9. 
Assumption A2 (unbiasedness) E [yijl&l 
1, • • •  ,n, j 1, • . •  ,m, are 
9 for all i, j. 
Assumption A3 (linearity) E [Of Y] = y + & • Y where y is a constant, & 
is a vector of n X m constants, Y = CY1, • • •  ,Yn) is the signal 
generated by researchers for producers, and Yi = (yil,"''Yim) is
exclusively for producer i. 
Assumption Al ensures the noncooperative nature of the game. 
That is, each research firm conducts its research independently and 
each production firm receives exclusive signals. Assumption A2 
implies that the research data is "good" information and then all it 
matters is its precision. Assumption A3 restricts the assumed 
probability distributions to a special class which is wide enough to 
include many interesting prior-posterior distribution pairs such as 
normal-normal, beta-binomial and gamma-Poisson (see Degroot (1970) and 
Ericson (1969)), It not only enables us to get the explicit form and 
the uniqueness of the equilibrium, but also facilitates the 
information trading. Let X
j 
= (yij'''''Ynj) be all the signals 
provided by research firm j. We have the following lemma (See L i  
(1985) for the proof). 
Lemma 1 Suppose Al, A2, and A3 hold. Then 
1,. . .  ,n,j 
__i_ 
t + Ryi' i 1, • • .  ,n, and i 
1, • . •  m, 
__L_ 1, 
•
. .  ,m, where R • Var [&] ' 
The above lemma addresses the equivalence between receiving 
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( 2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
( S) 
(6) 
one signal Yi and m signals yil'''''Yim for producer i, and also the 
equivalence between generating one signal xj and n signals yij'''''Ynj 
for researcher j. More explicitly, note that tij = 0 means researcher 
j is not to provide any information for producer i. So, production 
firm i is indifferent in contracting research from any specific 
researchers in any amount as long as the total amount of contracted 
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research ti= �tij remains the same since signals yil'''''Yim are 
used in an aggregated way as if one signal yi with expected precision 
ti is received. Similarly, researcher j only cares the total level of 
research sold, �j' Therefore the research contracts can be additively 
aggregated or disaggregated as if they were ordinary commodities, 
Finally, we assume that the underlying probability distributions are 
common knowledge. Hence, g(O} is the common prior distribution that 
firms have for o. Each production firm can compute a posterior 
f(Olyi.ti} for O on the basis of a chosen level of contracted research 
ti and the resulting information yi. 
The model is a two stage game. In the first stage, the true 
value of 0 is generated. Production firm i contracts a research level 
tij with research firm j. Or, in other words, each research firm 
chooses a level of research �j to sell and each production firm 
chooses a level of research ti to buy. In the second state, 
conditional on the contracted research levels tij' the signals 
Yi'' . .  ,Yn are generated. Producer i observes the research levels 
contracted by other producers tj, j f i, but only observes his own 
private signal Yi. Production firms then determine their output 
levels lq1 • . . . ,qn). 
Next we define the payoff function of each player in the game. 
Given the choices ((t1.q1),, .. ,(tn, qn)) by the n production firms and 
the price of a unit of research v, the profit of producer i is then of 
the form, 
(7) 
The payoff to producer i in the second stage game is the 
expected profit given signal Yi and the choice levels (t1, • • .  ,tn}'
i.e. , E [ni
1Yi,(t1, • . . •  tn}] , and the payoff to producer i in the first
stage then is the profit which is to obtain in the second stage with 
strategy choices (q1, • . . •  qn) expected over possible value of Yi' 
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( 8) 
The payoff to researcher j is simply its profit 
( 9) 
The equilibrium notion we adopt is that of a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. Formally. a (n + m}-tuple of strategies 
• • • • • • 
<�1 • . . . •  �m.
<t1,q1l •• • •  ,(tn,qn)) is an equilibrium if (i) for each i, 
• 
qi(Yi,(t1 . • . ,tn)) is the best response of producer i given other 
• 
firms' choices qj(Yj,(t1 •.•. ,tn)), j f i, for each Ct1, • . .  ,tn} and 
• 
almost every Yi in the second stage game, (ii) for each i, ti(v) is 
the best response of producer i given other firms' choices 
• • • 
tj(v}, j f i, and the second stage Bayesian strategies (q1 • • . .  ,qn), 
m • n • 
for each v e JR + in the first stage, (iii) �l�j = J;1ti' and (iv} for 
• • 
each j, �j is the best responses of researcher j given �k' k f j and 
• • • • 
((tl,ql),. 
• 
, ,(tn,qn)}' 
Basically, we are looking for an market-clearing price v•, 
under which the payoff to each player is maximized. Since production 
firms are assumed to be price-takers in the first stage, the market-
clearing condition (iii) determines a demand function for research 
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provided that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. In fact, the 
research firms in this game play the role of the Stackelberg leaders 
in the sense that they determine the producers' reaction function or 
demand function for the ex ante information as a function of the price 
v, and then strategically exploit the demand curve. The research 
firms can carry out this kind of inference if we assume that the 
linear demand and cost function of production, and their coefficients 
a, b, and c, are common knowledge. In fact, as we will show later, 
the knowledge of the linear demand and linear cost plus coefficient b 
is sufficient for researchers to infer the reaction function of 
producers. 
3. EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section, we derive the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium for the game, which is unique if the game is continuous. 
We proceed by solving the second stage game first. 
Proposition 1 For any fixed Ct1, • • •  ,tn), there is a unique Bayesian­
Cournot equilibrium to the second stage game for almost every 
CY11 . . .  ,Yn). The equilibrium strategy for each producer i is of the 
form 
t + 2R a - c + ___ __.__ ___ _ (n + 1)b n t1 
b(1 + �
1 tj + 2R
) 
and the payoff to each producer i with the Bayesian strategy is 
(1) 
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(2) 
The rigorous proof of the theorem has been given by Li, 
McKelvey and Page (1985). The uniqueness of the equilibrium and the 
explicit forms enable us to determine the payoffs to producers for the 
first stage game in terms of their choices Ct1, • • •  ,tn) and the price 
of research v, i. e. , 
1 (a - c)2 
b(n + 1)2 
( 3) 
Thus, lTi is the payoff function of producer i in the first stage
given Bayesian strategies follows in the second stage, and the first 
stage game is then reduced to a game with complete information. We now 
specify the strategy space for players in the first stage game. We 
choose a simplest and most natural one which is to let each player's 
strategy space be the non-negative reals, lll +. Note that this choice 
is doable when g(O) is normal and the relevant signals are also 
normally distributed with mean a. Other information structures may 
restrict the strategic choice of the precision of the signal, ti or 
�j' as the expected precision may be a function of the signal only 
through the number of observations. In this case, the appropriate 
strategy space is the scaled non-negative integers. Nevertheless, the 
equilibrium of the game with continuous strategy space is a good 
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approximation to the symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategy of the 
discrete game given the same parameters (see Li, McKelvey and Page 
(1985)). The continuity assumption of the strategy space also 
facilitates the direct application of calculus technique as we 
commonly do with ordinary commodities, A choice of ti s m+ for 
producer i simply selects a signal of a given expected precision ti. 
We impose a upper bound T (> 0) for each research firm's choice Ti to 
indicate the technical difficulties of exhausting the uncertainty 
completely, i.e., �j s [0,�] for j 
= 1, • • .  ,m. 
Proposition 2 For any given value v 
(i) There is a unique Nash equilibrium (t1(v), • • •  ,tn(v)) for 
production firms which is symmetric, i.e. , t1(v) = • . •
(ii) The equilibrium ti is a strictly decreasing and convex function 
of v. 
The proof can also be found in Li, McKelvey and Page (1985). 
In fact, letting t(v) = ti(v) for all i, we have the following 
equation (first order condition) which determines the functional 
relation between the equilibrium t and the value v, 
v = 
(3n - llt2 + 2R(n + 2)t + 4R2 
b(t + 2R)((n + l)t + 2R)3 
Denote the total demand for research from the production firms by 
T � �
1
ti = nt. Equation (4) can be rewritten as 
v(T) n
2£(3n - l)T2 + 2n(n + 2)RT + 4n2R2l 
b(T + 2Rn)((n + l)T + 2Rn)3 
(4) 
( 5) 
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Equation (5) provides a downward-sloping and convex inverse demand 
function for research (Fig. 1). Clearly, it is not necessary for one 
to know parameters a and c in infering this demand curve. Notice 
coefficient b is also irrelevant in the decision making by researchers 
(see Proposition 3). So we can weaken the common knowledge assumption 
in the preceeding section by assuming the linear demand and linear 
cost structure is common knowledge for all players while the 
coefficients a, b, and c are common knowledge only among producers. 
Now, the equilibrium value of research can be obtained by 
examining the strategic behavior of the research finns subject to the 
inverse demand function (5). By the market clearing condition, the 
payoff to research fiMD j is 
(6) 
Note that the profit function of each research fiMD is always positive 
except TT�(O,T_j) = 0 and TT� C00.�_j) = 0 where 
�-j = (Ti, • • • •  �j-l'�j+l' '""�m)' Though TTj <·,T-j) is not concave, we 
still have the following nice result. 
Proposition 3 For fixed m and n, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
Proof: For m = 1, 
w1 
2 2 2 2 n T1[(3n - l)Tl + 2n(n + 2)T1R + 4n R ] 
b(Tl + 2Rn)((n + l)Tl + 2Rn) 
3 ( 7) 
AMOUNT OF RESEARCH DEMANDED BY PRODUCERS 
ToTAL 
AMOUNT OF 
RESEARCH (T) 
AS A FUNCTION OF PRICE v 
FIGURE 1 
13a 
1 
4hR2 
PRICE PER 
UNIT OF RESEARCH 
(v) 
Direct calculation shows that 
where 
anr 
= 
n2h(i;l) 
ai:l b(i:1 + 2Rn)
2((n + lli:1 + 2Rn)
4 
• 
4 2 3 2 2  2 2h(i:1) = -(n + 1)(3n - l)i:1 - 4n(n + 3)Ri:1 - 4n (n - 4n + 6)R i:1 
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( 8) 
Polynomial h has the following properties: h(O) > 0, h(�) < O and the 
sequence of its coefficients switch only once in sign. Hence h has 
arrr 
only one positive root i:1
°. and this implies -;---1 > o for i:1 < i:0 u i:1 1' 
arrr arrr 0 
ai:: < O for i:1 > i:�. and ai:l (i:1) = o. We then conclude 
• 0 -i:1 = min(i:1, i:> is the unique maximum point. 
For m L 2, 
ann � = v(T) + i:jv'(T), 
where T = 
v' (T) 
Note that 
2 
[(n+1)(3n-l)T3 + 2Rn(3n2+4n+3)T2 
6(T+2Rn)2((n+l)T+2Rnl4 
(10) 
lS 
(11) 
and 
v(T) + �'(T)2 
2 
[2nR(n2+4n-3lT3+4R2n2(6n-l)T2 
6(T+2Rn)2((n+l)T+2Rn)4 
So, for T 
j 
i t or T j i )" Tk , k'FJ 
v(T) + T jv' (T) 2. v(T) + fv• (T) > o. 
(12) 
(13) 
• • • 
Suppose (T1, ••. ,Tm) with some j such that Tj T is an equilibrium. 
I • -Let Jc (l, . • .  ,m}, and J = (j Tj < T}. Then observation (13) 
implies T; > f" T� for j s J, This implies 
k'FJ 
(fJI - 2) f" T; + (m - IJI>� < 0 for m 2 2, a contradiction. Hence 
jaJ . -
Tj = T, j = 1, •.. ,m is the unique equilibrium. 
Q,E.D. 
It is worth mentioning that the research firms will sell as 
much information as they can for m 2. 2 is not true in general. It 
depends on the specific form of the reaction function resulting from 
the special assumptions of the probability distributions and the 
linear demand function for tangible goods, and the assumption that the 
information is produced at no cost. However, the qualitative 
description of the equilibrium behavior will not be altered in more 
general settings. 
Let us summarize the equilibrium behavior of the players in 
• 
this game. As Stackelberg leaders, the equilibrium strategy Tj for 
each research firm determined in Proposition 3 is his best choice 
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• 
given other researchers' choices Tk' k F j and the strategic reactions 
of production firms. 
• m • 
The total research in trade is T = )" T and 
.Fi J 
the equilibrium value (price) of the ex ante information is 
• • • • 
v = v(T ), Given v , the equilibrium strategy ti(v ) for each 
production firm determined in Proposition 2 is his best response 
• 
conditioning on other producers' strategies tk(v ), k Fi and the ex 
post Bayesian equilibrium output choices of the oligopoly. Finally, 
• • 
the Bayesian strategy qi(yi,(t1 • • • •  ,tn)) determined in Proposition 1 
gives producer i's best choice based on his private signal yi 
• 
generated according to h(·IO,ti), 
4. CONVERGENCE AND EFFICIENCY
In this section, we show that the convergence property is 
regained with the augmented market mechanism described above, and the 
competitive equilibrium is efficient as the number of producers as 
well as the number of researchers become large. 
• 
The equilibrium amount of research producer i buys ti depends
on m and n. We denote t� by t�n, and y�n is the signal generated 
according to h(•fo,t�n). 1 n Also let Y = -r- ymin' mn nf=1 Then conditional on 
9, Ymn is a sum of n independent and identically distributed random 
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variables which depend on n and m through tmn, It is easy to see the 
total output ex post is 
n (n + l)Tmn Q - [a - c + Y J mn ( n + 1) b ( n + 1 )Tmn + 2nR mn 
• 
( 1) 
And Q = a b c is the competitive total output if the true state 9 is
known and takes its mean value zero, We are seeking the condition 
under which Qmn converges to Q conditional on 9 = O. 
Obviously, 
(n + l)Tmnlim 1, and 
m�m (n + l)Tmn + 2nR
n �m 
n(a - cl _ !L..::__Q lim ( n + 1 ) b - b 
n �m 
(2) 
( 3) 
Notice that for m 2 2, Tmn = m� nt
mn or tmn = � �. Suppose we let 
m = kn, k > O. Then y�n do not depend on m and n and have the same 
distribution. Therefore the fact that 
a.a. 
Ymn � 0, as m, n � "" (4) 
follows directly from the strong law of large numbers. Combining (2), 
(3), and (4), we have 
a.a. 
0mn � Q, ( 5) 
However, we can obtain a slightly stronger result (Proposition 
4) by using the following uniform strong law of large numbers given by 
Mickey (1963, p. 40). 
Lemma 2 (the uniform strong law of large numbers) 
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Let g be a function on Z X D where Z is a Euclidean space and 
D is a compact subset of a Euclidean space, Let g(z, d) be a 
continuous function of d for each z and a measurable function of z for 
each d. Assume also that lg(z, dl l ! h(z) for all z and d, where h is 
integrable with respect to a probability distribution function F on z. 
If z1, z2, 
• •
• is a random sample from F then for almost every sequence 
(6) 
Uniformly for all d in D. 
Applying Lemma 2, we have 
Proposition 4 Given 9 = 0, °ran converges almost surely to Q as n � m 
and n ! B where B is a positive constant. m 
0 ( 7) 
( 8) 
We assume conditional on 9 = 0, zi are i.i. d. random variables. In 
fact a sequence of 1.1. d. random variables {zi) can be obtained in 
mn this manner in many examples such as ti varies only via the 
number of 
19 
observations under general distribution assumptions and t�n varies 
continuously under normality assumption. Let 
d mn = 
11 = rn. 1--;n 1� 
t mi: 
It follows that 
y mn 
Since ; i B, 
( 9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Let g(z,d) =dz, D = [O,BJ, h(z) = Bz and F be the conditional 
distribution function of zi given e = O. Then all the conditions for 
Lemma 2 are satisfied and we have 
(12) 
uniformly for all d in D. Whence for any convergence sequence [dmnl' 
1 n 
nk1 dmnzi 
a.s. 
� 0, (13) 
which is equivalent to 
a.s. 
Y --) 0, as n � "" _mn i B. mn (14) 
Q.E.D. 
The purpose of proving the above slightly stronger result is 
to illustrate where the convergence theorem might break down in the 
previous models with endogenous information acquisition. Condition 
n mi B is critical for the proof. Suppose m stays unchanged. Then 
this condition is violated when n goes to infinity and the proof 
collapses. This clearly indicates that competition among the 
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information providers plays an essential role in reaching an efficient 
competitive equilibrium when the endogeneity of costly information 
acquisition is introduced. Since demand is linear, convergence of Qmn
to Q implies the convergence of the equilibrium random price to the 
perfectly competitive price which is equal to the marginal coat of 
production c. 
As one can expect, the ex ante total social welfare from the 
information Cournot equilibrium converges to an efficient one as the 
market becomes more competitive in the sense that it maximizes the 
total social welfare (consumer plus producer surplus). Suppose that 
for any given level of research T (expected precision), a social 
planner selects a level of output Q baaed on a observed signal y 
generated according to h(·le.T) to maximize the conditional total 
social welfare defined as ECWlyJ, where 
Q 
W J n-1(0,0)dQ - cQ - vT 
0 
(a - c + 0)0 - �02 - vT. 2 
The maximizer Qe(y) is found to be 
(16) 
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(17) 
and the expected total social welfare following the choice Qe(y) is 
( 18) 
On the other hand, we can also calculate the expectation of 
the total social welfare resulting from the equilibrium behavior of 
the oligopolists, i.e., 
Proposition S 
(i) 
1 nT
.
((n + 2)T• + 3nR) • • + - - v T .  2bR ((n + l)T• + 2nR)2 
(ii) If Il � B, then m 
That is, the competitive limit maximizes the expected total social 
welfare. 
Proof: 
(i) It can be calculated 
(19) 
2 (a - c) 1 
2b(n + 1)2 
+ 2bR • • 2 > 0 (T + R)((n + l)T + 2nR) 
22 
for m, n l 1. (20) 
(ii) Note that Il i B implies T• = m� l nB-1�. Therefore it is easy m 
to see that as n -> m, 
• • v(T )T 
2 • •2 • 2 2 n T [(3n - l)T + 2n(n + 2)T R + 4n R l 
b (T• + 2nR) ((n + l)T• + 2Rn)3 
� O, ( 21) 
(22) 
( 23) 
by equation (3.S) , (18) and (20). 
O. E.D. 
S. CONCLUSION 
This paper was motivated by the idea how an efficient 
competitive equilibrium could be obtained in a setting where diverse 
partial information is acquired by individuals endogenously. We show 
that the remedy is to introduce an ex ante information market. Though 
the problem is solved for a special case, namely a Cournot oligopoly 
with linear demand and linear conditional expectation information 
structure, the treatment of an information equilibrium can be applied 
elsewhere. For instance, Milgrom (1981) considers a special example 
23 
of a Vickrey auction with information acquisition. The two stage game 
does provide a demand curve for any given price c of the signal, and 
the treatment in our paper is applicable. Certainly, one should admit 
the possibility that the outcome of trading may depend critically on 
the nature of the trading process, and that the variety of possible 
outcomes may not be representable by any single model. However, the 
notion of the equilibrium value of information studied in this paper 
will be useful in the discussions of the value of information in other 
trading processes. Our treatment of information ex ante as if it is 
an ordinary commodity by defining its proper measurement may also be 
enlightening. 
24 
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